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EVEN  A  QUICK PERUSAL of the daily paper suggests the controversial 
nature  of international  trade  in the United States today. Canada  and  the 
United  States  are  skirmishing  over stumpage  fees for  lumber  and  support 
prices  for corn.  The European  Community  and  the United  States, having 
recently  reached  a truce  in their  grains  and  luxury  edibles  disagreement, 
are now arguing  about airplanes  and oilseeds. The United States and 
Japan  are circling  in round  two of their  semiconductor  match. Germany 
and Switzerland  refuse to restrain  voluntarily  their exports of machine 
tools to the United States. U.S. soybean producers  demand  a counter- 
vailing duty on Argentine soybean products because, they charge, 
Argentina's  differential  export tax encourages  soybean  production.  Do 
these trade problems have a common foundation? Do  the specific 
disputes  threaten  to escalate  into  broader-based  conflicts  involving  more 
products  or more countries?  Can the historical  record  shed light on the 
causes and consequences of such trade  arguments? 
A major  lesson of the past is that  periods  of macroeconomic  stress in 
the United States have tended  to precipitate  changes  in the conduct  and 
implementation  of U.S. trade policy. Those changes can then lead to 
escalating  trade  tensions and  perhaps  retaliation  by the United States or 
by its trading  partners. The focus in this paper is on changes in the 
conduct  of U.S. policy primarily  because the consequences of a change 
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in the conduct  of the largest  trading  nation  are  probably  greater  than  the 
consequences  of any  policy changes  by other  trading  nations.  Moreover, 
in  the  past  two years,  the  United  States  arguably  has  changed  its approach 
to trade  policy to a relatively  greater  degree than other countries  have 
changed  theirs. 
The worst era of U.S. macroeconomic  stress and changes in trade 
policy was 1929-31.  Although  macroeconomic  problems  in that  era  were 
far more pressing than the problems  today, both periods are similarly 
characterized  by severe macroeconomic  imbalances,  a Congress  (with 
its regional  constituency)  relatively  stronger  than  the president  (with  his 
national  constituency), and policymakers  who perhaps  incorrectly  as- 
cribe to trade  policy the ability  to restore macroeconomic  equilibrium. 
In 1930  these three  factors  working  together  produced  the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff  Act. Tariffs  were increased on thousands  of products, with the 
average  tariff  rate on dutiable  imports  rising 13  percentage  points to 53 
percent from 1929  to 1931.  Between 1980  and 1986,  these three factors 
contributed  to a more than doubling  of the number  of countervailing 
duty and antidumping  cases, from  93 cases in 1980  to 197  cases in 1985, 
and a quadrupling  of "unfair"  foreign  trade  practices cases, from 11 in 
1980  to 42 in 1986. 
Not all historical  periods  characterized  by these three economic and 
political  factors have suffered  the apparent  breakdown  of international 
consensus about the conduct of trade  policy that produces retaliation. 
In 1922,  the Fordney-McCumber  Act raised average  U.S. tariff  rates 9 
percentage points to 38 percent. Yet U.S.  trading partners did not 
retaliate  against this tariff  hike as they did against the Smoot-Hawley 
tariffs. In the  1960s and 70s, the United States and the European 
Community  skirmished  over steel, chickens, pasta, and citrus without 
the specter of Smoot-Hawley  appearing  in the diplomatic  and popular 
press alike. 
The  critical  fourth  characteristic  common  to the Smoot-Hawley  period 
and  today  is the view of U.S. trading  partners  that  U.S. actions  are  either 
unjustified  within the consensual code of international  behavior or 
unexpected  given the past behavior  of the United States in international 
trade negotiations. In 1930, the United States failed to play by the 
established  rules of the game:  it indiscriminately  increased  many  tariffs 
with no apparent  domestic objective, and it imposed sweeping tariffs 
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United States changed  its interpretation  of the rules of the game: it has 
widened  the scope of foreign  policies that elicit offsetting  duties, and it 
has increasingly  used trade  threats  against  one industry  to extract  trade 
concessions in another industry. Faced with such radical changes in 
established  U.S. trade  behavior,  other  countries  may agree  to negotiate 
on the new terms, or they may decide not to negotiate  and instead  may 
retaliate. 
A simple game-theory payoff matrix in which two countries can 
choose to negotiate  to open markets  or retaliate  and close markets  will 
help in analyzing  such a situation.  For example, macroeconomic  stress 
changes  the political  and  economic  benefits  of pursuing  an open markets 
trade  policy, thus changing  elements of the payoff matrix.  If the United 
States  increases  the  range  of foreign  policies  that  elicit  offsetting  penalties 
or penalizes one industry  for infractions  in another,  it also changes the 
payoffs in the matrix. When the United States changes its established 
behavior  by threatening  to impose  penalties, U.S. trading  partners  must 
decide whether to  believe the threat. The effect is  to  reduce the 
confidence  of the trading  partner  in the payoffs in the old matrix  versus 
the payoffs  in the new matrix.  The  magnitude  of the change  in the payoffs 
and the likelihood that these changes reflect a new strategy are both 
critical determinants  of whether countries end up in a trade war with 
closed markets  or decide to negotiate  and  open markets. 
The structure  of the paper  is as follows. First, I detail  the features  of 
the macroeconomic,  political, and institutional  landscape common to 
the Smoot-Hawley  era and  the present. That  examination  suggests  a set 
of stylized facts about the political and economic gains or losses of 
following  a particular  trade  policy strategy.  I also describe  the similarities 
and  differences  between the League of Nations and the General  Agree- 
ment  on Tariffs  and Trade  (GATT)  for their  codifying  of the rules of the 
game and for their dispute-settlement  procedures, and I suggest the 
extent  to which  these differences  may contribute  to a reduced  likelihood 
of a trade  war  today. 
Then I show how a set of simple game-theory  payoff matrices can 
provide  a framework  for these stylized facts. The model suggests that 
retaliation  was not a necessary result of the Smoot-Hawley  tariffs, nor 
would  it be a necessary consequence of U.S. protectionism  today. The 
analysis  further  points out what factors may be important  contributors 
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Finally, I discuss incidents of retaliation  for the Smoot-Hawley  bill 
and analyze some cases of protection and retaliation  from the 1980s. 
This event analysis fits the hypotheses generated  by the game-theory 
analysis. 
Smoot-Hawley  Era and the 1980s 
In terms  of severity, global  reach, and  depth  of economic  dislocation, 
there is little comparison  between the macroeconomic  problems  of the 
1930s  and those of the 1980s.  Nevertheless, relative  to recent historical 
experience, the macroeconomic  imbalances of the 1980s are severe, 
especially from the viewpoint of the United States. Moreover, most 
economists believe the proximate  causes of the macroeconomic  imbal- 
ances in both eras to be macroeconomic  in nature.  Yet, in both periods, 
policymakers  turned  to trade  policy to provide  at least a partial  solution 
to the macroeconomic  problems. 
MACROECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT 
Between 1929  and 1931,  price deflation  and unemployment  were the 
most severe problems  confronting  the nation.  Agricultural  prices fell 50 
percent, while unemployment  rose from 3.2 percent to 15.9 percent. 
Many  economists argue  that the cause of the Depression  was monetary 
restraint  combined  with  fiscal  inaction.  But  at  the  time,  the  policymakers' 
solution to the problems of deflation  and unemployment  was to raise 
domestic prices and redirect demand towards domestic producers  by 
increasing  tariffs.  For the Republican  party,  then in office, the tariff  was 
the "household  remedy." Moreover, as F. W. Taussig  notes, "All the 
popular  debates of the last generation  . ..  inculcated  the belief that the 
mere imposing of a duty served at once to benefit the domestic pro- 
ducer....  The rank and file welcome[d]  immediate  and drastic tariff 
charges."  I Unfortunately,  prohibitive  tariffs  imposed by all countries 
drive trade to zero.2 Thus the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, along with 
1. F. W. Taussig, in Heinrich  Liepmann,  Tariff Levels  and the Economic  Unity of 
Europe (MacMillan,  1938),  p. 225. 
2. The original  article  discussing  optimal  tariffs  and retaliation  is Harry  G. Johnson, 
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retaliation  and  other  economic  dislocations  of the time, achieved  exactly 
the opposite of  what policymakers had hoped. Agricultural  prices 
continued  to slide, and the unemployment  rate rose to 24.9 percent by 
1933. 
In the 1980s,  the massive current  account deficit  in the United States 
is the key imbalance.  Causes include  the large  U.S. fiscal  budget  deficit 
and a relatively low U.S. personal saving rate. The Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings deficit reduction law attempts to target the macroeconomic 
imbalance  at its source. But the omnibus trade bills currently  under 
consideration  in Congress  focus on righting  the trade  imbalance  through 
trade  policy actions  such  as imposing  surcharges  on imports  from  trading 
partners that enjoy large bilateral credit balances and linking U.S. 
imports  of certain countries' products to U.S. export performance  in 
their  domestic markets. 
A second force behind  use of the tariff  in the 1930s  was real  exchange 
rate  variability.  Under  the notion  of the "scientific  tariff,"  the appropri- 
ate tariff  was the one that  equalized  the costs of production  at home and 
abroad.  As the Depression  deepened,  postwar  gold  parities  broke  down, 
and  even Britain  left the gold standard.  In the ensuing  "currency  warfare 
...  tariffs became a very important weapon  ...  in meeting the compe- 
tition  of the European  and overseas devaluation  countries.  " 3 
In the 1980s  real exchange rate variability  has likely been one of the 
causes of increased  trade complaints  by U.S. industries.  As the dollar 
appreciated,  U.S. companies  petitioned  for emergency  protection  from 
import  surges. Other  companies  charged  foreign  importers  with pricing 
below cost of production  or sales price in their home markets  through 
the countervailing  and antidumping  (CV/AD) statutes. The CV/AD 
caseload  more  than  doubled  from  1980  to 1985.  As the dollar  depreciates, 
the number  of CV/AD  cases is rising  as foreigners  cut profit  margins  and 
prices on goods sold into the U.S. market  in an effort to maintain  their 
pp. 142-53.  Johnson  shows that two large countries  with elastic offer curves will drive 
trade  to zero if they both  try to impose  optimal  tariffs.  However,  if one of the offer  curves 
has an inelastic  portion,  trade  will not go to zero. Kiyoshi Kuga, "Tariff  Retaliation  and 
Policy Equilibrium,"  Journal of International  Economics,  vol. 3 (November 1973),  pp. 
351-66, presents this argument  more formally. Carlos Alfredo Rodriguez,  "The Non- 
equivalence  of Tariffs  and  Quotas  under  Retaliation,"  Journal ofInternationalEconomics, 
vol. 4 (August  1974),  pp. 295-98, examines  quotas  and  retaliation,  finding  the same  basic 
result. 
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market  shares in the United States. Projected  at an annual  rate, the 79 
cases filed  between  January  and  April  this year  suggest  a further  increase 
of 20 percent  over the 1985  caseload. 
Another  similarity  between  the 1930s  and  the present  is the magnitude 
of some countries' external debts and the concomitant  pressures on 
them to reduce  their  imports  in order  to repay  these debts. In the 1930s 
German  war  reparations  (had  they been paid)  ranged  up to 50 percent  of 
exports. In the 1980s, the pressures on the Latin American  debtors to 
reduce their imports exacerbated  the U.S. current  account deficit. In 
1980,  U.S. exports  to Latin  America  accounted  for 17  percent  of export 
volume. By 1985,  that share  had  dropped  to 14  percent. 
POLITICAL  ENVIRONMENT  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Historically, Congress has presided over changes in tariff rates 
because of its constitutionally  mandated  power to levy taxes. However, 
over the decade before Smoot-Hawley,  Congress  delegated  some of its 
tariff  authority  to the president.  Believing  that  the pace of technological 
progress, and therefore  the decline in foreign  prices, was too quick for 
each specific tariff  case to be submitted  to legislative  review, Congress 
passed the Fordney-McCumber  Tariff of  1922 to give the president 
authority  to adjust  tariffs  on specific commodities  up or down as much 
as 50 percent. The president  could raise (or lower) a tariff  on a specific 
product to equalize the domestic and foreign costs of production as 
calculated  by the nonpartisan  Tariff  Commission,  the predecessor  to the 
International  Trade  Commission.  In  fact, the president  made  only thirty- 
seven changes in specific tariffs, of which thirty-five  were increases, 
between 1922  and 1930.4 
As the economic dislocation  of the Depression deepened and prices 
continued  to fall, Congress  reasserted  its right  over the specifics  of tariff 
policy and produced the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Initially a bill to 
increase agricultural  tariffs, Smoot-Hawley  could not have passed had 
the agricultural  interests  not formed  a coalition  with  certain  manufactur- 
ers.5  Eventually,  the bill engendered  20,000  pages of testimony  covering 
4.  Asher  Isaacs,  International  Trade:  Tariff and  Commercial  Policies  (Chicago: 
Richard  D. Irwin,  1948),  p. 255. 
5. Barry  Eichengreen,  "The  Political  Economy  ofthe Smoot-Hawley  Tariff,"  Working 
Paper  2001  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  August  1986),  p. 18. Forthcoming  in 
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25,000  products.  An example  of the remarkable  detail  in the bill is cork, 
for  which  there  were eighteen  different  tariff  rates.6 After  Smoot-Hawley 
passed, dutiable  imports  rose from 34 percent of total value of imports 
in 1929  to 48 percent in 1931. Average duty rates on dutiable  imports 
rose from  39 percent  in 1929  to 53 percent  in 1931  to 59 percent  in 1932.7 
Today Congress  is again  asserting  its mandate  to direct  trade  policy. 
Characteristics  of Smoot-Hawley common to the current  House and 
Senate omnibus trade bills include special treatment  for a number  of 
specific industries and restrictions on the president's discretionary 
powers over trade policy decisions. The omnibus trade bills contain 
articles limiting  the right of the president to veto trade protection for 
industries  that have received an affirmative  judgment  of injury  by the 
International  Trade  Commission.  Other  articles  would  require the pres- 
ident to retaliate  against  the imports  of countries  if the ITC determines 
that  they use unfair  trade  practices  to restrict  U.S. exports. Unfair  trade 
practices are defined very broadly, ranging from domestic "market 
reservation"  policies to targeting  "traditional"  U.S. overseas markets. 
Moreover, amendments to  the omnibus trade bills single out new 
industries,  such as titanium  and telecommunications,  for special treat- 
ment. 
INSTITUTIONAL  ENVIRONMENT 
Today, as in the 1930s,  multilateral  forums  exist for the discussion of 
international  trade  problems.  In  the late 1920s  and  early 1930s  the League 
of Nations sponsored several meetings  to discuss and try to limit tariff 
increases. But the meetings were oriented  more toward  crisis manage- 
ment  and  arresting  the unraveling  international  trade  situation  in Europe 
than  toward  reestablishing  the consensus about  the circumstances  under 
which  countries  could  apply  protectionist  policies and  about  what  should 
be the overall characteristics of protectionist policies if such were 
deemed necessary. Today, the GATT principles represent a general 
consensus on the international  rules of trade  policy behavior. Perhaps 
because the GATT principles  are relatively clear, even if their imple- 
mentation  is woefully vague, there is hope that the GATT Uruguay 
Round currently being held in Geneva will be  more successful at 
6.  Isaacs, International Trade, pp. 239-40. 
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preventing  an escalating trade war than was the League of Nations 
Convention  of March  1930. 
The  World  Economic  Conference  of 1927,  attended  by representatives 
from fifty nations, unanimously  concluded that "the time has come to 
put a stop to the growth  of customs tariffs  and to reverse the direction 
of movement."8 As the business cycle turned  in 1929, the Economic 
Committee  of the League of Nations noted with great  concern that "in 
spite of a few sporadic  efforts no decisive movement has occurred  in 
this direction.'"  9  It called  for a two-year  tariff  truce. Thirty  nations sent 
delegates with negotiating  authority,  and seven nations  sent observers, 
to the March  1930  convention,  which  produced  a draft  agreement  stating 
that signatories  would not abrogate  their existing commercial  treaties 
for at least two years and would increase tariffs  only in the case of an 
undefined  domestic emergency. But the draft text was never put into 
effect. An escalating  round  of tariff  increases was under  way; nothing 
could stop it. 
One of the factors that may help prevent  escalating  retaliation  today 
is the GATT.  The GATT  articles, signed  by nearly  one hundred  nations, 
with more still  joining, are vaguely  worded,  cannot  be enforced,  and  are 
critically  uncomprehensive  in both the range  of trade issues addressed 
and solutions allowed. Nevertheless, simply by weight of numbers, 
GATT represents a consensus on what most believe should be the 
guiding  principles  of external policy. Protection  must be nondiscrimi- 
natory  and should  be based on a price mechanism  that  is limited  in time 
and scope; countries must compensate their trading  partners  if they 
invoke emergency protection;  and GATT contracting  parties agree to 
bring  trade  disputes to GATT, even if results of the committee  deliber- 
ations cannot  be enforced. 
However, interpreting  and implementing  the principles are quite 
difficult, especially when doing so  causes a nation's domestic and 
external  policy objectives  to conflict,  as they do in the most contentious 
issues in the drafting  of the agenda for the Uruguay  Round-services 
trade,  agricultural  subsidies, and  intellectual  property  rights. 
To sidestep  some of the principles  and  obligations  of GATT,  members 
turn to policies that are not within the spirit, although they are not 
8.  Liepmann, Tariff Levels,  p. 348. 
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explicitly outside the letter, of GATT. Market reservation schemes, 
nontariff  barriers,  and voluntary  restraint  agreements  on exports are 
several examples. These policies are derogations  from  the GATT  prin- 
ciples, and they weaken the established  GATT  consensus, maintaining 
which  may be key to avoiding  an escalating  round  of tariff  retaliation. 
Once  Congress  responds  to mounting  concern  about  trade  by changing 
the conduct and implementation  of U.S. trade  policy and by deviating 
from  the  established  international  rules  of the  game,  U.S. trading  partners 
are necessarily confused about the future course of U.S. trade policy. 
They may not understand  why the United States is now complaining 
about or even retaliating  against policies that heretofore had been 
acceptable. Once the largest trading partner decides to play with a 
different  set of rules, other countries  can similarly  reinterpret  the rules 
to their  advantage.  The consequences  of trading  partners  failing  to agree 
on the rules are confusion,  threats,  and  perhaps  retaliation. 
Game Theory and Trade Protection 
A simple game-theory  model will help show how a change in one 
country's  attitude  toward  protection  and a corresponding  change  in the 
perceptions of that country's trading  partners  that it has changed its 
trade  policy strategy  could lead either  to negotiation  that  opens markets 
to trade  or to retaliation  that  closes markets.  '0 The  model  is only a simple 
presentation  of the stylized  facts  using  agame-theory  paradigm.  Virtually 
all the difficult  aspects of the solution  are saved for another  paper,  and I 
ignore  the technical  aspects of game theory  that would stand  in the way 
of this simple  presentation. 
10. Marie  Thursby  and  Richard  Jensen  use a conjectural  variation  approach  to analyze 
how the magnitude  of an optimal tariff changes with an increase in the likelihood  of 
retaliation.  See Marie  Thursby  and Richard  Jensen, "A Conjectural  Variation  Approach 
to Strategic Tariff Equilibria,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  vol.  14 (February 
1983),  pp. 145-61. They find that an increased  likelihood  of retaliation  by one player 
decreases  the  tariff  that  is optimal  for  the  other  player  to apply.  Raymond  Riezman,  "Tariff 
Retaliation  from a Strategic  Viewpoint," Southern  Economic  Journal, vol. 48 (January 
1982), pp. 583-93, considers an equilibrium  where two players negotiate tariffs. The 
negotiated  tariffs  lie between  the optimal  tariff  rates  of the two players.  The relative  size 
of the two actors  is key to the magnitude  of the negotiated  tariffs;  the larger  player's  tariff 
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As the payoff matrix  displayed  opposite shows, the two countries  A 
and B can choose two strategies, negotiate (N) or retaliate (R). The 
negotiation  strategy is one by which the countries reduce tariffs and 
open their  markets  to trade;  the retaliation  strategy  increases  tariff  rates 
and  closes markets  to trade.  The elements  of the cells show the payoffs, 
which could be measured  in utility terms, that each country  obtains at 
the equilibrium  of theirjoint  strategies.  1I For example,  if the equilibrium 
results in each country  negotiating  and opening  its markets,  country  A 
obtains  ANN units of utility  and country  B obtains  BNN units of utility. If 
the equilibrium  results when country  B negotiates  and country  A retal- 
iates, then the payoffs are shown  in the southwest  cell, where country  A 
obtains  ARN units of utility  and  country  B obtains  BRN. 12 
11. We could think  of payoffs in the matrices  coming  from  a social welfare  function 
where the payoff from pursuing  any particular  strategy  is a function  of macroeconomic 
events and  trade  policy lobbying  activity. One strand  of the economics  literature  focuses 
on this latter point of lobbying  and the political economy of tariff  formation.  A good 
overview  piece on this  topic  is Robert  E. Baldwin,  "The  Political  Economy  of Protection- 
ism," in Jagdish  N. Bhagwati,  ed., Import Competition  and Response (University of 
Chicago  Press, 1982),  pp. 263-86. For papers  that  examine  in more  detail  the outcome  of 
lobbying behavior where politicians and workers play a game against each other to 
determine  the magnitude  of a protective  tariff,  see Stanislaw  Wellisz  and  John  D. Wilson, 
"Lobbying  and Tariff  Formation:  A Deadweight  Loss Consideration,"  Journal  of Inter- 
national Economics, vol. 20 (May 1986), pp. 367-75; Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw 
Wellisz,  "Endogenous  Tariffs,  the  Political  Economy  of Trade  Restrictions,  and  Welfare,  " 
in Bhagwati,  ed., Import  Competition,  pp. 223-43;  Wolfgang  Mayer,  "Endogenous  Tariff 
Formation,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  74 (December  1984), pp.  970-85;  and 
Robert  C. Feenstra  and  Jagdish  N. Bhagwati,  "Tariff  Seeking  and  the Efficient  Tariff,"  in 
Bhagwati,  ed., Import  Competition,  pp.  245-61. Both  players  weigh  politicaland  economic 
costs and  benefits,  and  in some cases consider  the welfare  effects to the nation  as a whole 
of applying  a tariff.  Mayer  returns  to first  principles  to examine  how ownership  of capital 
and  labor,  factor  mobility,  and  industry  diversification  affect  the negotiated  tariffs. 
12. Two  articles  that  explicitly  acknowledge  the  role  of retaliation  in  the  tariffformation 
process are Wolfgang  Mayer, "Theoretical  Considerations  on Negotiated  Tariff  Adjust- 
ments,"  Oxford  EconomicPapers,  vol. 33  (March  1981),  pp. 135-53;  and  Richard  Baldwin, 
"Optimal  Tariff Retaliation  Rules" (Columbia  University, November 1986). Mayer's 
paper  focuses mainly  on optimal  tariffs  and retaliation  in the case where players  are of 
different  economic sizes. But he does consider the implication  for the home country's 
tariff  choice if there  are domestic  lobbying  groups  of different  size and  strength.  Baldwin 
focuses on how the likelihood  of retaliation  in export  markets  should  affect the lobbying 
activity  for tariff  protection  in the home market.  He assumes  that  firms  produce  for both 
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Country B 
N  R 
Country  A  ANN,  BNN  ANR,  BNR 
R  ARN,  BRN  ARR  BRR 
Equilibrium  in any  particular  cell may  result  either  from  a cooperative 
decision  to pursue  particular  strategies  or from  failure  to cooperate. For 
example, the payoffs shown below yield a noncooperative  equilibrium 
in the closed markets corner of the matrix, the southeast corner, in 
which both countries  (in this case Europe  and the United States) lose 4 
units of utility. If these two countries cooperated, they could reach a 
negotiated  outcome, in which each obtains 1 unit of utility.  13 
United States 
N  R 
Europe  N  1,  1  -5,  2 
R  2,  -5  -4,  -4 
The above matrix  could represent  payoffs faced by Europe and the 
United States during the Smoot-Hawley period. The United States 
believed that closing its markets would increase domestic demand, 
leading  to a higher  payoff than  would free trade  (UNN  =  1 while UNR  = 
2).  However, once  the United States chooses  the closed  markets 
strategy,  Europe  minimizes  its losses by also choosing  the  closed markets 
strategy. (If the United States chooses R, Europe loses 5 units if it 
chooses N and  loses 4 units if it chooses R.) There  is no way in this one- 
shot game  to avoid the worst-case outcome. 
But  suppose  neither  Europe  nor  the United  States  had  full  information 
regarding  the payoffs. For example, suppose  the payoffs from  choosing 
the open markets  strategy  is some weighted average of gain 1 unit and 
gain 3 units. In other words, both the United States and Europe might 
have weighted the gains from trade too lightly, perhaps because of 
political  pressures  from  lobbying  groups.  The matrix  that  follows shows 
13. Cooperation  cannot be sustained in the one-shot game presented here. Trade 
policy is a natural  application  for the repeated  game format,  but I have not chosen that 
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this structure,  where Q, the weight, is assumed  for simplicity  to be equal 
for the United States and Europe. 
United States 
N  R 
Europe  N  Q.1+(1-Q).3,  Q.1+(1-Q).3  -5,  2 
R  2,  -5  -4,  -4 
For any Q less than 0.5, the expected payoff to cooperating  would be 
greater  than 2 for each country  if both chose negotiation  and free trade 
(N). In this case, neither  would be tempted  to leave that outcome, for 
the R strategy  promises  a worse outcome  whatever  the other side might 
do in return. Thus this analysis suggests that uncertainty regarding 
payoffs is important  in determining  the outcome of trade  negotiations. 
Consider now the present-day situation. Instead of focusing on 
uncertainty  regarding  the  payoffs, I will examine  the effect  of uncertainty 
facing U.S. trading  partners  with regard  to the overall conduct of U.S. 
trade  policy. Suppose  the other  country  is Japan,  and  payoffs are shown 
below. The left-hand  matrix  displays  payoffs  before  about 1985.14  Given 
the payoffs displayed  in that matrix,  the noncooperative  equilibrium  is 
in the southwest corner. An equilibrium  in the southwest corner  might 
result  from  a U. S. political  utility  function  in which  the moral  imperative 
of maintaining  a liberal trading environment exceeds any economic 
losses associated with Japan's strategy  of closed markets. This result 
could come from  a variety  of different  weights on moral  benefits  versus 
economic costs in the utility  function. 
Before 1985  After 1985 
United States  United States 
N  R  N  R 
Japan  N  4, 4  2,2  Japan  N  4  3  -2,2 
R  8,3  0,0  R  8,-I  -4,0 
Suppose now that for the United States the balance between moral 
benefits  and  economic costs of pursuing  a free trade  policy has changed 
over the past several  years, thus affecting  the entries  in the matrix.  The 
large  current  account deficit increases the political and economic con- 
14. In 1985  the president  initiated  his trade  policy "Strike  Force" and  the House and 
Senate  started  work  on a new trade  bill. Catherine L. Mann  323 
sequences  of maintaining  a liberal  trading  environment,  and  reduces  the 
utility  obtained  by being  a free trader.  This  change  may  reduce  the payoff 
to the United States associated with a negotiation strategy  (UNN  falls 
from  4 to 3, and  URN falls  from  3 to -  1). Congress  has also made  it easier 
for U.S.  industries to obtain injury  judgments and protection and to 
impose  penalties  for dumping,  a change  that  increases  the penalty  facing 
Japan  if the United States retaliates  (JNR  changes  from  2 to - 2, and  JRR 
falls from  0 to - 4). The right-hand  matrix  shows values consistent with 
these stylized  facts. 
The key question  is whether  the change  in the conduct of U.S. trade 
policy, as parameterized  by values in the post-1985  payoff matrix,  will 
change  Japan's  trade  policy from a closed markets  strategy  to an open 
markets  strategy.  Will  uncertainty  about  whether  U. S. policy has in fact 
changed  cause Japan  to underestimate  the expected value of the open 
markets strategy, choose the closed markets strategy, and force the 
United States into a trade  war?  The answers to these questions  depend 
on whether  the United States can credibly  threaten  to retaliate  if Japan 
chooses the retaliation  strategy, what probability  Japan  assigns to the 
likelihood that the post-1985 matrix accurately reflects U.S.  payoffs, 
and  the magnitude  of the difference  between Japan's  positive payoff if it 
negotiates and its penalty if it chooses a retaliation  strategy and the 
United States retaliates  as well. 
Changing  the payoff URN from 3 in the pre-1985  matrix  to -  1 in the 
post-1985  matrix creates a credible threat; it is no longer in the U.S. 
interest  to negotiate  regardless  of Japan's  strategy.  If Japan  chooses the 
retaliation  strategy,  then the United States will choose that strategy  as 
well. Japan  will lose 4 units of utility, while the United States will get a 
zero payoff. However, this credible  threat  is effective in getting  Japan 
to change  policies to the open markets  strategy  only if Japan  puts enough 
weight  on payoffs in the post-1985  matrix.  Therefore,  it is a combination 
of the magnitude  of the change in payoffs and Japan's  belief about the 
state of thinking in the U.S.  Congress that determine whether the 
negotiation  or retaliation  equilibrium  results. 
Let the perceived  probability  that the United States has not changed 
its payoffs of conduct be given by P. Then P equals Japan's  belief that 
the pre-1985  matrix  accurately  reflects  the payoffs associated  with U.S. 
trade  policy and so will dictate U.S. conduct. Calculate  the expected 
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represented  in the two matrices.  If Japan  chooses a negotiation  strategy, 
its expected payoff  is 
N  =  P.Jpre  +  (1  -  P).JNNs  =  P 4 +  (1 -  P) 4 =  4. 
If Japan  maintains  the closed markets  strategy,  its expected payoff is 
R  =  p.JRN  +  (1  -  p).JRR  =  P 8 +  (1 -  P) (-4)  =  12P  -  4.  pre  post 
Where  P equals  2/3,  the expected value of the negotiation  strategy  equals 
the expected value of the retaliation  strategy.  If P is greater  than  2/3,  then 
Japan will keep the closed markets strategy, the United States will 
change  to that  strategy,  and  the  retaliation-trade  war  equilibrium  obtains. 
But, for any  P less than  2/3,  the expected value of the negotiation  strategy 
is greater  than  the expected value of the retaliation  strategy.  Japan  will 
choose the open  markets  strategy,  and  the United  States  will  do likewise. 
The United States is better  off than  it was in the equilibrium  strategy  in 
the pre-1985  matrix,  although  Japan  is not as well off. But  both are  better 
off than they would be under the retaliation-retaliation  strategy  in the 
post-1985  matrix. 
What  can the United States do to get Japan  to choose the negotiation 
strategy?  It can increase Japan's conviction that the post-1985  matrix 
represents  the true  payoffs and strategies-that is, increase  the threat  of 
retaliation.  Or it can increase the penalties of the retaliation-retaliation 
equilibrium,  which will also raise the value of P required  to make  Japan 
choose the negotiation  strategy.  15 The  posturing  in Congress,  the threats 
of retaliation, the stricter application of trade laws, and the actual 
incidents  of retaliation  by the United States are ways of communicating 
changes  in the values of the payoffs, thus informing  trading  partners  that 
they should  not look back at the old game, but  forward  to the new game. 
As this simple  example  points out, it is not clear that  the outcome for 
either or both countries is superior  to that obtained  before the United 
States changed its conduct, the outcome associated with the pre-1985 
matrix.  The UNN element in the post-1985  matrix  is the same as URN in 
the pre-1985  matrix. But it is clear that the open markets strategy is 
superior within the confines of the payoffs in the post-1985 matrix. 
Therefore, the uncertainty about whether U.S.  conduct has in fact 
15. In a repeated  game framework,  we could think  of a set of payoff matrices,  each 
representing  an update  on what  Japan  believes are  the payoffs. Catherine L. Mann  325 
changed  is critical  for the correct  choice of trade  strategy  by the trading 
partner.  That  is why when the largest  trading  nation  changes  the way it 
plays the game, confusion and retaliation  may result, at least until the 
rules  of the new game are known  to all. 
Retaliation 
The model suggests that the retaliation  equilibrium,  in which both 
countries pursue a trade strategy that closes markets, is more likely 
when  the losses due to that  outcome  are small  or are  weighted  too lightly 
by the second country when it tries to determine whether the first 
country's trade strategy has changed. Both the historical record on 
retaliation  after Smoot-Hawley  and the trade disputes currently  under 
way support  this hypothesis. 
SMOOT-HAWLEY  PERIOD 
Not all the tariff  increases in Europe and Latin America  during  the 
1930s  can be attributed  to the Smoot-Hawley  tariff. As already  noted, 
the League of Nations convened a conference  to discuss tariff  increases 
in Europe  well before Smoot-Hawley  was even in committee.  Although 
distinguishing  between retaliatory  trade  actions and  ones that a country 
would have taken anyway is difficult,  I will present three examples in 
which the timing  and  the specificity  of the actions suggest  retaliation.  A 
key theme of these cases is that these countries  retaliated  because they 
felt that the U.S.  tariff action against them was a violation of the 
established  code of international  behavior. 
During  the 1920s  and 1930s,  many  politicians  and  economists  felt that 
international  flows of gold, as well as of credit,  determined  domestic  and 
international  growth and stability. When the price-specie flow mecha- 
nism  works as it should, surplus  countries  gain gold supplies  leading  to 
increases  in domestic  wages and  prices. Rising  wages and  prices in turn 
increase  absorption  and  reduce  competitiveness,  yielding  gold flows out 
of the country. If gold flows are restricted by limiting trade, deficit 
countries  cannot  achieve rising  income, prices, and  wages. 
The  Smoot-Hawley  tariff  undermined  the workings  of this mechanism 
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balance of payments surplus.'6  Some U.S. politicians  even hoped that 
Smoot-Hawley  would  return  the country  to autarchy.  As other  countries 
saw it, the United States was trying to reduce permanently  the gold 
supply  in circulation,  yielding  further  declines in prices and activity in 
the deficit  countries.  Asher Isaacs reports  that  Italian  editorials  charged 
the United States with "attempting  to corner  the gold supply and ruin 
the entire  world, especially Italy."  17 
Another  element  of the  established  code of international  trade  conduct 
was that tariffs  could be applied  to protect domestic industry.  But the 
Smoot-Hawley tariffs also hit innumerable  products that the United 
States  did not, or in some cases could  not, produce.  As Isaacs protested, 
"Many of the items are not competitive  with American  items because 
they come from different  climates or resources not found in this coun- 
try....  Few,  if any,  can be regarded as competing  with products  of 
American  'infant'  industries.  On  the other  hand,  many  of these products 
are vital to the protesting countries since they constitute important 
export  items." 18 The 1,000  percent  increase  in the tariff  on cashew nuts 
was, said Isaacs, quoting  cables from India, "unjustified  whilst United 
States not producing  cashews. [The] cashew industry  in British India 
will be destroyed."  19 
U.S. trading  partners  watched  the Smoot-Hawley  bill barrel  through 
Congress, becoming more far-reaching  by the day. More than 1,000 
economists warned  of the dangers  of retaliation  and the consequences 
to economic activity of a world trade war. Some thirty-five  countries 
sent official cables threatening  retaliation  should the bill become law. 
Some of the foreign cables were diplomatically  worded, others more 
strident.  The Japanese  government  cabled, "Japan's  purchasing  power 
is in a large measure  derived from her exports, especially those to the 
United States. Any decrease in her exports to the United States, 
therefore, cannot but reduce her demand for American  products."20 
France cabled that there were  "protests  .  .  . on the part of numerous 
16. In fact, Eichengreen, "The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley  Tariff," 
hypothesizes that Smoot-Hawley  probably  worsened the Depression  more through  its 
influence  on the international  financial  system  than  through  anything  else. 
17. Isaacs,  International  Trade, p. 236. 
18. Ibid., p. 231. 
19. Ibid. 
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groups  of exporters  and manufacturers  [because the] minimum  French 
tariff  has been granted  to almost all American  merchandise  without  the 
slightest corresponding  advantage having been obtained for French 
trade."2' When the Smoot-Hawley bill became law, some countries, 
including  Spain, Italy, and Canada,  retaliated  by selectively imposing 
tariffs  on U.S. exports;  others, including  Italy, required  a zero bilateral 
trade balance; still others, including  Canada, removed U.S. products 
from  most-favored-nation  status. 
In 1929  the United  States  imported  57  percent  of the entire  cork  output 
of Spain. When a combination  of tariff  and nontariff  barriers  cut U.S. 
imports  of Spanish  cork  to zero, Spain  retaliated  by increasing  tariffs  on 
U.S.  assembled autos 100 to 150 percent. To avoid transshipment  of 
unassembled  autos through  Europe, Spain taxed those as well. Duties 
on other manufactured  products  in which the United States enjoyed a 
comparative  advantage, such as sewing machines, motorcycles, and 
razor  blades, also rose substantially,  as much  as 700 percent  in the case 
of the razor  blades. Moreover,  the Spanish  market  for U.S. exports  was 
ruined,  as France "within  six weeks sent a brilliant  crew of commercial 
experts  to negotiate  a treaty  with Spain  [such  that]  France  found  herself 
enjoying  preferential  treatment  on practically  all the commodities  which 
our  exporters  lost.  22 
In Italy  U. S. auto  exports  were a retaliatory  target  for Smoot-Hawley 
tariffs  on ships, marble,  and textiles. "Un-heard  of duties" stopped  car 
imports,  and  Ford  closed its assembly  plant.  In addition,  "Italian  drivers 
[of American  cars]  were embarrassed  and  annoyed  by having  their  tires 
punctured....  The Royal  Automobile  Club  of Italy  wanted  to publicize 
the names of all Italians  buying American  cars." Mussolini  said, "We 
will buy in the United States only the amount  of goods equivalent  to the 
amount  of goods the United States will buy in Italy." Exports  from the 
Soviet Union to Italy rose from $18 million in 1929  to $29.5 million in 
1931,  during  a time  when world  trade  value  fell in half, suggestive  of who 
replaced  the U.S. exporters  in the Italian  market.23 
The Smoot-Hawley bill targeted Canadian  products from all prov- 
inces. Moving from east to west, Smoot-Hawley increased tariffs on 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid.,  p. 235. 
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halibut,  dairy  products,  potatoes, cattle, grains,  apples, and lumber.  To 
retaliate, Canada raised tariffs on 125 U.S.  products. She expanded 
British preference and explicitly discriminated  against certain U.S. 
exports. Chemicals  from  England  were duty-free,  chemicals  from  other 
countries  entered  with  a 10  percent  duty, but U. S. chemicals  got slapped 
with a 25 percent surcharge.24 
Taking this historical evidence and applying  it to the game-theory 
paradigm  may reveal broad generalities about possible influences on 
U.S.  policymakers  that induced them to pass the Smoot-Hawley bill 
even in the face of threats  of retaliation.  In the game-theory  paradigm, 
the United States  chooses the closed markets  strategy  when  the political 
rewards  outweigh possible economic losses of the strategy. Certainly 
politicians  of the constituents  benefitting  from  high  Smoot-Hawley  tariffs 
saw political  benefits  and  may have expected economic  benefits  as well. 
Moreover, the closed markets-retaliatory  outcome is more likely the 
lower the probability  the United States puts on the likelihood of a 
retaliation  strategy  being pursued  by its trading  partners.  Perhaps  the 
United States underestimated  the likelihood of retaliation by other 
countries,  despite the cables. The United States probably  also underes- 
timated the economic losses  resulting from retaliation. Given these 
beliefs, the worst-case  closed markets  outcome resulted. 
As trade  volume and  domestic welfare  continued  to fall to the trough 
of the Depression, the closed markets philosophy increasingly  came 
under  fire.  The denouement  of Smoot-Hawley  was the Reciprocal  Trade 
Agreements  Act of 1934,  the stated  goal  of which  was to "expand  foreign 
markets and regulate  imports."25  But, more important,  Congress au- 
thorized  the president  to negotiate  bilateral  and  reciprocal  tariff  treaties. 
Country-by-country  the United States would try to negotiate the open 
markets  strategy  in the hopes of achieving  the beneficial  outcome that 
clearly  had  not been attained  through  the closed markets  strategy. 
THE  1980S 
In the Smoot-Hawley era, the United States had to analyze the 
likelihood  of retaliation  and  the magnitude  of the losses should  retaliation 
24. Ibid., p. 237. 
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take place. In the 1980s, by contrast, it is other countries that must 
decide whether  the United States is likely to retaliate  and  how large  the 
penalty might  be if it does. The Smoot-Hawley analysis suggests that 
the United States can encourage its trading partners to pursue the 
negotiation-open  markets strategy by making  the economic losses of 
retaliation  large  and  by convincing  its trading  partners  that  it will in fact 
retaliate.  The recent actions taken  by the United States in the Canadian 
lumber,  European  Community  luxury edibles, and Japanese semicon- 
ductor  cases may represent  ways of signaling  that  the United States will 
retaliate  and  that  the stakes are high. 
President  Reagan  instituted  his trade  policy "Strike Force" in Sep- 
tember  1985.  Since then, the administration  has aggressively  interpreted 
existing trade  legislation,  and Congress  has tightened  other legislation. 
The first effect has been to  confuse U.S.  trading partners, whose 
heretofore acceptable domestic or external policies are now inviting 
retaliation.  The  U.S. change  in stance  may  encourage  its trading  partners 
to review their  own trade  policies and strategies.  One  result  could  be an 
increased  level of more  specific  and  more  politically  motivated  protection 
in the United States and  abroad  with a concomitant  greater  potential  for 
retaliation  as consensus about  the standard  of international  trade  behav- 
ior breaks  down. Another  could be greater  negotiation  (in the Uruguay 
Round, for example) and possibly a new consensus with a more open 
markets strategy being pursued by all. To what extent can the U.S. 
conduct  of trade  policy affect the outcome?  First, the United States can 
make clear that the payoffs have changed. Second, it can make clear 
that  its trade  strategy  has changed. 
When  countries sign the GATT, they agree to a standard  of interna- 
tional  behavior  regarding  emergency  protection  and offsetting  penalties 
for certain  domestic policies. Moreover,  even when emergency  protec- 
tion is  allowed and "fair," it must follow the GATT principles of 
transparency,  nondiscrimination,  and market  orientation.  Article XIX, 
the safeguard clause, outlines the emergency situations that allow 
temporary  protection for specific industries and details the rules of 
compensation  for imposing  any protection.  Articles VI and XVI, coun- 
tervailing  duty, antidumping,  and export subsidy rules, suggest what 
domestic and external policies can elicit offsetting duties by another 
country.  These rules of the game are not binding  and are neither clear 
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these ideas in principle and have agreed to bring disputes over their 
implementation  to the GATT  under  Article XXIII, dispute settlement. 
The articles  of GATT,  therefore,  represent  a relatively  stable  consensus 
on what trade policies are grounds  for penalties but not for escalating 
retaliation. Moreover, applying protection allowed under the GATT 
does impose a discipline. As Gardner  Patterson  puts it, "An important 
cost  of  discrimination  .  .  .  [is]  the  necessity  of  reporting  on  it  and 
defending it periodically in semi-public  forums before an essentially 
hostile audience.  "26 
The United  States  has close analogues  to the GATT  articles  in its own 
trade  laws. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the so-called escape 
clause, allows emergency protection of industries  injured  by imports. 
The countervailing  and antidumping  statutes allow offsetting  penalties 
for a wide variety of foreign policies. But the United States also has 
Section 301 of the Trade  Act, which allows the president  to act against 
the imports  of any country that the ITC finds to be using policies that 
restrict  U.S. exports. 
Since 1985, the United States has become much more aggressive in 
its definition  of policies that  can elicit penalties. Both the administration 
and Congress  are interpreting  U.S. trade  law and GATT  articles much 
more broadly. The administration  has reopened trade cases  closed 
several years ago. It has unilaterally  expanded  the list of external and 
domestic  policies eliciting  "fair" CV/AD  penalties. It has leveraged  the 
CV/AD statutes with Section 301 to try to gain market  access for U.S. 
exports in foreign markets.  It also has negotiated  numerous  voluntary 
restraint  agreements  and other creative agreements  that probably  run 
counter  to the GATT  principles  of transparency  and  nondiscrimination. 
Following  are a number  of specific  cases of these kinds. 
The administration  closed the Canadian  lumber  case three years ago 
when the ITC  found  no injury  and the Commerce  Department  found no 
dumping and no subsidies to production. In the intervening years, 
Canadian  stumpage  policy, which  the U. S. industry  charged  is a subsidy, 
has  not changed.27  Yet when  the case was reopened  last  year, Commerce 
found  a subsidy  and  the ITC  found  injury.  The United States threatened 
26.  Gardner Patterson,  Discrimination  in  International  Trade Policy:  The Policy 
Issues, 1945-1965  (Princeton  University  Press, 1966),  p. 38. 
27. Stumpage  fees are the price  of a right  to cut lumber  on government  land. Catherine L. Mann  331 
a 15 percent countervailing  duty, but Canada  chose instead to levy an 
export tax of the same amount. More important,  Canada,  feeling that 
reopening the lumber case constituted trade harassment, applied a 
countervailing  duty  on U. S. corn  imports,  charging  that  U. S. farm  policy 
subsidizes corn. It was the first case ever of a countervailing  duty on 
U.S. farm  products. The case smacks of tit-for-tat  retaliation,  and the 
demonstration  value  of the Canadian  duty  is larger  than  the small  volume 
of Canadian  corn imports  would suggest. In terms of the game-theory 
paradigm,  the closed markets  outcome resulted  probably  because Can- 
ada considered  the economic losses of retaliation  significantly  smaller 
than  the political  gains. 
Another  case is the recent U.S.-European  Community  (EC) dispute 
over EC enlargement.  Upon joining the EC, Spain and Portugal  redi- 
rected  to France  annual  purchases  of about  $400  million  of U.S. grain,  a 
practice  permitted  under  GATT  rules. The United States retaliated  for 
this loss of export markets with 200 percent prohibitive  tariffs on a 
variety  of EC luxury  edible exports such as wine, cheese, ham, and  gin. 
Hours before the tariffs  were to take effect, the United States and the 
EC negotiated  an agreement  that  allows U.S. grain  exporters  to compete 
with community  producers  for part  of the Spanish  market.  In this case, 
it appears  that  the threat  of prohibitive  tariffs  raised  the economic stakes 
sufficiently to encourage a negotiation-open markets strategy. Also, 
imposing  the tariffs,  and  then giving  the EC an opportunity  to negotiate 
them  away, increased  the perception  that  the United States  was serious. 
The U.S.-Japan semiconductor  accord of July 1986 and the more 
recent imposition of tariffs on certain Japanese electronics is another 
interesting  case. Following  an affirmative  finding  of dumping  of certain 
kinds of semiconductor  chips, the United States and Japan  negotiated 
an agreement  designed  first  to reduce the flood of chips into the United 
States, second  to increase  the price  of chips  without  differentially  hurting 
U.S. users  of chips, and  third  to enhance  the position  of U.S. chipmakers 
in Japanese  markets.  In order  to meet the second objective, the U. S. did 
not want  simply  to apply  dumping  duties. Instead,  the accord  appears  to 
come close in spirit  to fixing  the world  price  for certain  kinds  of chips.28 
28. The Commerce  Department,  using Japanese  production  cost data, decides on a 
"fair"  price  for  Japanese  chips  that  includes  an 8 percent  profit.  The  Japanese  government 
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The Commerce  Department  has since charged  the Japanese  govern- 
ment with failing to monitor export prices, thus allowing chips to be 
dumped  through  third  markets.  The administration  imposed 100  percent 
tariffs  on $300 million of Japanese electronic products such as laptop 
computers,  certain  television sets, and power-driven  hand  tools. Coin- 
cidentally,  some of the affected firms  have U.S. competitors  that have 
been trying to crack the Japanese market. The tariffs come at a time 
when  Japanese  producers  are  particularly  vulnerable  in  the U. S. markets 
because of the yen appreciation;  Korean  and Taiwanese  producers  are 
ready  to step in. Therefore,  it appears  that  the Commerce  Department's 
retaliation  for the Japanese  government's  nonperformance  on the chip 
agreement  could impose some economic losses on Japan.  Although  the 
tariffs  have been  imposed,  Commerce  has said  that  they  will  be rescinded 
as soon as Japan  can  prove  that  it is not dumping  chips  into  third  markets. 
Thus,  as in the luxury  edibles  case, there  is an  opportunity  for the United 
States and Japan  to reach the negotiated  outcome. But this negotiated 
outcome might  not have been possible had the United States not shown 
that it is serious about retaliation,  which in turn raises the probability 
Japan  puts on the losses associated with a trade  war. 
Various  aspects of the semiconductor  case have been brought  to the 
GATT.  The  EC  has  filed  a case arguing  the illegality  of the semiconductor 
accord. Even though the accord appears to be nondiscriminatory,  it 
certainly does not meet the market  test required  of GATT-approved 
methods of protection. Moreover, Japan  threatens  to file in the GATT 
for compensatory  damages,  arguing  that in fact it has met the terms of 
the agreement. If so, the U.S.  tariffs may come under Article XIX, 
which allows the affected  country  to apply  compensating  tariffs. 
Other examples of a change in U.S. policy stance can be found in 
Section 201  cases, in which Congress  has loosened the requirements  for 
obtaining an affirmative  judgment of injury from the ITC. Changes 
include relaxing  the requirements  that imports be the most important 
cause of injury  and that injury be measured primarily  by changes in 
employment.  Now, imports  need be only one of several  causes, and  the 
ITC  must  measure  injury  much  more  broadly  than simply  by changes  in 
employment.  With  the new legislation  in place, the nonrubber  footwear 
case turned  from  a no-injury  decision in 1983  to a vote of injury  in 1985. 
Under  existing  law, the president  need not abide  by the ITC  recommen- 
dations, and  in the footwear  case, President  Reagan  vetoed any protec- Catherine L. Mann  333 
tion. That  presidential  discretion  is one loophole Congress  is aiming  to 
close. 
In another  example  of how the United States is signaling  its intention 
to play hardball  in the trade  policy game, the administration  has begun 
to use Section 301, "unfair  trade  practices," as a threat  to open export 
markets. If a country is found to be unfairly  closing markets  to U.S. 
exports, the president  can retaliate  against  any product  exported from 
that  country.  This rather  broad  mandate  has led to agreements  opening 
the Korean insurance market and the Japanese tobacco market, the 
latter of which involves removing  a 26 percent tariff  and restructuring 
the domestic  tobacco monopoly.  In two cases, one against  Japanese  rice 
producers and the other against Argentine soybean producers, the 
president  has used the discretion  with which he is currently  empowered 
and refused to act. Again, Congress  wants to eliminate  that discretion. 
Moreover,  the omnibus  trade  bills expand the definition  of unfair  trade 
practices to include such issues as workers' rights and targeting of 
traditional  U.S. overseas markets. 
An interesting  problem  involving  these negotiated  301 settlements  is 
cheating.29  In the Korean  insurance  case, for example, the initial  settle- 
ment apparently  opened the market. But U.S.  companies were not 
initially allowed to participate  in a compulsory financing  pool, so a 
second case was threatened.  In a Japanese telecommunications  case, 
the  United  States  charged  the  Japanese  with  unfairly  limiting  competition 
in the telecommunications  market because Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph  (NTT) was a government  entity. The Japanese  government 
agreed to take NTT public, and it is now a public corporation,  all of 
whose shares  are owned by the government. 
The Reagan administration  is also using other existing legislation 
more extensively in the trade arena, applying Section 232 (national 
security)  to products  ranging  from  machine  tools to frozen  concentrated 
orange  juice. Taiwan  and  Japan  agreed  to voluntary  export  restraints  on 
machine  tools, perhaps because they are used to having this kind of 
policy "negotiated," and after all, they do get the economic rents for 
their  trouble.  Switzerland  and  Germany  did  not agree  to such restraints. 
29. Cheating  can be put  into the game-theory  paradigm  by making  payoffs  a weighted 
average  of the  cheat  and  no-cheat  values.  However,  the  repeated  game  format  is a necessity 
for  this  model  to make  sense. 334  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1987 
Because Swiss and German  machine tools do not compete with U.S. 
products,  the two countries  argued  that the U.S. threat  was politically 
motivated,  that  voluntary  restraints  run  counter  to GATT  rules, and  that 
they would not be party to any such agreements. The president has 
threatened  to slap quotas on their machine  tools if their exports to the 
United States exceed a specified  level. 
Collectively these actions seem to signal  a shift in U.S. trade  policy. 
Even so,  U.S.  behavior is hard to predict. Moreover, the costs  of 
retaliation  are hard to quantify. In some of the specific cases noted 
above, threats  of U.S. retaliation  apparently  led to negotiations  to open 
markets.  In others, it appears  that  tit-for-tat  retaliation  strategy  is being 
pursued.  Therefore,  the United States cannot  be sure that its threats  of 
retaliation will lead to  other countries choosing the open markets 
strategy. 
For that reason  the United States is engaged  in both multilateral  and 
bilateral negotiations to increase the economic gains from an open 
markets  strategy  and to increase  the likelihood  that other  countries  will 
pursue that strategy. The GATT Uruguay Round brings to the table 
many topics and many  countries. On a smaller  scale, the United States 
has negotiated  a free trade  agreement  with Israel  and is negotiating  one 
with Canada. There is also mention of trade agreements with areas 
ranging  from Mexico to the Southeast Asian nations. Together, these 
two negotiation techniques may be  the best way to maximize the 
likelihood  of the open markets  strategy  being  pursued  by all. 
Conclusions 
An examination  of the macroeconomic, political, and institutional 
environment  of the 1930s  and the 1980s  reveals certain  circumstances 
that lead to trade  tensions and incidents  of trade  retaliation.  Periods  of 
macroeconomic  stress, especially when linked to external  events such 
as trade  imbalances,  decrease the political  benefits  to the United States 
of following a liberal and open markets trade policy. During these 
periods, Congress, with its regional constituency, may be relatively 
more  powerful  than  is the president,  with his national  constituency.  The 
shifting  balance  of power may further  undermine  support  for free trade. 
As a result,  the conduct  of U.S. trade  policy becomes somewhat  difficult Catherine L. Mann  335 
for  trading  partners  to predict.  Moreover,  in  reexamining  its commitment 
to free trade, the United States may change its response to foreign 
policies, deviating  not only from its established  behavior,  but from the 
consensual  international  code of trade  conduct. 
These stylized relationships  between macroeconomic  environment 
and political and institutional  pressures can be analyzed in a simple 
game-theory  paradigm,  in  which  changes  in the environment  and  balance 
of political  power change the elements of a payoff matrix. But trading 
partners  may be uncertain  both about  the magnitudes  of the payoffs and 
about  the  likelihood  of the United  States  making  good  on its trade  threats. 
They may not be sure whether U.S.  policy has actually changed or 
whether political posturing and threats are just camouflage. Trading 
partners  therefore must choose a trading  strategy based on expected 
value of payoffs. This uncertainty  can result in an ex post suboptimal 
choice of trade  strategy,  possibly forcing  retaliation. 
Examining  instances of trade  tensions and trade  retaliation  from the 
1930s  and the 1980s  in light of the simple game-theory  paradigm  gives 
some support  for pursuing  this analytical  construct  further.  The policy 
implications  of the model are that the United States should, subject to 
the restrictions  of a democracy,  make  clear  both  the direction  of its trade 
policy and the magnitudes  of any penalties. Much  of the tit-for-tat  trade 
retaliation  observed in recent months  may represent  just such an effort 
to communicate. 